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A B S T R A C T
Low-carbon energy systems are more metal-intensive than traditional energy systems. Concerns have been ex-
pressed that this may hamper the transition to a low-carbon economy. We estimate the required extraction of Fe,
Al, Cu, Ni, Cr, In, Nd, Dy, Li, Zn, and Pb until 2050 under several technology-specific low-carbon scenarios.
Annual metal demand for the electricity and road transportation systems may rise dramatically for indium,
neodymium, dysprosium, and lithium, by factors of more than three orders of magnitude. However, in the base
year 2000 the dominant uses were often in other sectors. Since growth in these other, previously dominant
sectors has been less pronounced, the overall growth in society’s metal needs is much less dramatic than in the
electricity and transportation sectors. Total annual demand for the researched metals would rise by a factor of
3–4.5, corresponding to compound growth rates of between 2% and 3%. Such growth rates are similar or lower
compared with historical growth rate levels over the last few decades. Prolonged higher levels have existed for
copper, for example, with production rising by 8% per year from 1992 to 2006. Yet this state of affairs does not
give cause for complacency. The richest resources may have been used, production is showing a tendency to-
wards becoming very large-scale, and development times have increased, all leading to greater risks of dis-
ruption. It is therefore crucial, when developing specific technologies, that the resource-specific constraints are
analyzed and options for substitution are developed where risks are high.
1. Introduction
Low-carbon energy systems are considerably more metal-intensive
than traditional energy systems, and authors have warned that this may
hamper the transition to a low-carbon economy (Alonso et al., 2012).
Especially assessments focusing on the implementation of low-carbon
technologies in the energy and transportation sectors show a dramatic
increase in the metal demands of those sectors (Kleijn et al., 2011;
Roelich et al., 2014). For some metals it has been reported that the
rapid increase in demand is not problematic. Availability of Lithium,
currently an essential element for electric vehicle batteries, is not ex-
pected to be a bottleneck for the rapid and widespread adoption of
electric vehicles (Gruber et al., 2011). On the basis of a dynamic ma-
terial flow model for the base metals aluminum, copper, chromium,
nickel, lead, and iron, Elshkaki and Graedel (2013) found that supply is
not limiting the introduction of renewable electricity generation tech-
nologies. On the other hand, they found that constraints in the supply of
silver, tellurium, indium, and germanium could limit the introduction
of some PV technologies (Elshkaki and Graedel, 2013). Most of these
studies, however, did not take into account that the additional demand
for low-carbon technologies should be considered in the context of a
general increase in primary production of these metals for the entire
economic system, also in relation to the build-up of infrastructure in
newly developing countries.
This paper investigates potential bottlenecks in the supply of a wide
range of metals, assuming the gradual introduction of far-reaching
climate policies leading to full global implementation by 2050. We use
a novel combination of methodologies, covering both the power gen-
eration and automotive sectors in detail and the broader economy more
generally.
The novel aspect of our method is that specific data on the metal
requirements for low-carbon energy and energy technologies are ana-
lyzed in combination with long-term socio-economic scenarios im-
plemented in a global multi-regional Input-Output model, which cap-
tures the global metal requirements and global greenhouse gas
emissions of the global economy. This allows us to create a consistent
scenario of metal demand and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. For
instance, if mining of a particular metal increases, there will be an
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increase in the amount of machinery needed for the mining sector, and
also in the associated electricity production (and hence GHG emissions)
for making that machinery.
A key consideration in developing this methodology is that the fu-
ture supply and demand of metals cannot really be predicted. There is
uncertainty about how energy technologies will develop and what their
metal requirements will be. Different scenarios with different assump-
tions concerning the penetration of low-carbon energy technologies can
be envisaged (IPCC, 2014; IEA, 2008; OECD, 2012a,b). It is unknown if
new options for substitution between metals and with other materials
will become available. Recent examples of this are the current shift in
plumbing from copper to polymers and aluminum (TEPPFA, 2013; Hix
and Seydel, 2016), and the way some automobile and wind turbine
producers avoided using neodymium when its prices spiked in 2011
(ENERCON, 2011; Tukker, 2014; Widmer et al., 2015). How the supply
of metals may develop is also unknown. The main supply constraint is
that a metal must be mined economically. The actual long-term supply
of metals is highly dependent on new (mining) technology, cumulative
availability curves, and expected and actual prices (Tilton and Lagos,
2007; Yaksic and Tilton, 2009; Gordon et al., 2007). Expected prices
determine investment in mines, for given funding options and within
political constraints.
The metals that we were able to analyze with the global multi-re-
gional scenario model were Fe, Al, Cu, Ni, Cr, In, Nd, Dy, Li, Zn, and Pb.
In the case of other metals, data on their extraction, reserves and use
were insufficient to make a full analysis, as we did for the eleven se-
lected metals.
2. Materials and methods
Long-term scenarios for supply and demand of metals are difficult to
make. This is particularly true for minor metals such as In, Nd, Dy, and
Li. New high-tech technologies can lead to disruptive demand change in
just a few years, while it can take 10 years or more to adjust production
and open new mines (Tukker, 2014). In this paper we try to deal with
this unpredictability by analyzing whether various contrasting sce-
narios for metal demand fall within a ‘viable operating space’ with
regard to supply. We define this viable operating space as a situation
where, in view of knowledge about economic reserves and past supply
growth rate, the supply can in principle meet the demand in the sce-
narios. If expected demand for a metal falls outside this operating
space, this strongly suggests a risk of steep price rises. In that case,
consideration should be given to developing material substitutes or
alternative technologies, or opening up new mining options.
The proposed concept of viable operating space for metal supply
and demand is based on the following information: (a) estimated an-
nual demand for metals in 2050 in a given scenario; (b) annual supply
of metals in 2000; (c) historical growth rates of this metal supply; (d)
estimated cumulative metal demand until 2050 in a given scenario; (e)
estimated economic reserves in 2000, and (f) historical growth rates of
these reserves. The assumption is that supply problems are likely to
occur if demand growth for a metal will be much higher in the future
than in the past, and/or if the cumulative requirements until 2050 are
significantly higher than the economic reserves in 2000, including the
observed historical growth rates of these reserves. These extrapolated
supply quantities and reserve volumes thus act as upper boundaries of
the viable operating space (see Fig. 1 for a conceptual graphical ex-
planation). This allows us to compare these boundaries with scenarios
for the rise required by the expected demand for metals in 2050 in
relation to supply in 2000, and to compare the current economic re-
serves with the expected cumulative metal demand until 2050. With
this information, we can make an overall assessment of potential bot-
tlenecks in the supply of metal resources due to effective climate policy,
or in positive terms: define the viable operating space.
It should be noted, however, that although our concept can give a
clear indication of future supply problems, it also has limitations. A
significant increase in demand could lead to substantial price rises,
which in turn would increase economic reserves: reserves that had been
too costly to mine can be extracted profitably at these higher prices. We
did not take this into account. But conversely, our approach also takes
no account of potential absolute limits to metal availability. While most
of the recent metal supply crises were related to disruptive demand
changes (e.g. Tukker, 2014; ERECON, 2015; Sprecher et al., 2015),
which are factors covered by our concept, in the longer term such ab-
solute scarcity problems could also play a significant role. We therefore
regard the boundaries derived from our concept as ‘upper boundaries’.
Whereas the actual supply rate (amount mined) of metals is quite well
known in 2000, there is less information about the economic reserves of
metals in 2000. Published estimates of economic reserves can vary
considerably and change rapidly, as shown by Gruber et al. (2011) for
Lithium. All the economic reserve data have been derived from the
USGS (Kelly and Matos, 2009).
Different supply scenarios can be envisaged on the basis of cumu-
lative supply curves and real prices, but such an was not carried out in
this study for two reasons. First, cumulative supply curves are uncertain
or unknown for the metals considered in this study. Second, cumulative
supply curves are only valid for currently known mining technology;
the cumulative supply curve shifts if cost-reducing technology changes
take place (Yaksic and Tilton, 2009).
As stated above, the demand for the eleven metals in 2050 in the
four scenarios is estimated by combining two methodologies. Global
metal requirements for low-carbon electricity and road transportation
systems are calculated from appropriately scaled Life Cycle Assessment
(LCA) inventories. Estimates for metal consumption in the rest of the
economy are based on a global multi-regional extended Input-Output
(IO) model, combined with expected GDP growth and extrapolation of
general historical efficiency improvements and specific changes in en-
ergy intensive activities (steel production, cement production, built
environment, domestic appliances). The metal requirements are based
on three scenarios superimposed on a business-as-usual scenario,
making a total of four scenarios. They are:
1) Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, on an 8° path. We based our
BAU scenario on historical developments, including efficiency im-
provements, extrapolated until 2050 (de Koning et al., 2014, 2016).
The GDP development in the BAU scenario, like all the other sce-
narios below, follows projections by the OECD (OECD, 2012b). It
appears that the GHG emissions in the BAU scenario constructed in
this way are on a trajectory towards 8 ° of global warming in 2100,
similar to the RCP8.5 BAU scenario (IPCC, 2014; de Koning et al.,
2014).
2) Technological Scenario (TS), on a 4° path. The second scenario is a
Techno Scenario (TS), which integrates all probable and possible
technical CO2 emission reduction measures currently envisaged. It is
a techno-optimistic scenario and includes, for instance, carbon
capture and storage (CCS) on all the remaining fossil fuel power
plants, widespread introduction of electric vehicles and complete
electrification of household heating. The TS brings us onto a tra-
jectory of about 4 ° of global warming, similar to the RCP4.5 sce-
nario (IPCC, 2014). GDP growth in the TS also follows projections
made by the OECD (OECD, 2012b).
3) Blue Map electricity supply (BMES) scenario of IEA, on a 4° path.
The third scenario is similar to the TS scenario except that the global
electricity supply mix in 2050 is taken from the IEA Blue Map sce-
nario (IEA, 2008), with 23% nuclear, 26% fossil with CCS, and 44%
renewables. The IEA Blue Map scenario suggests that by 2050 global
energy CO2 emissions would be halved compared with 2005 emis-
sions, which would put average global temperature increase on a
trajectory of 2–3 °C above pre-industrial temperatures. The CO2
emissions cut would have to be realized at the same time as the
world economy grows by 3.3% per year until 2050 and the global
population grows to 9.2 billion in 2050 (IEA, 2008).
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4) Rare Earth Metals (REM) scenario, also on a 4° path. The REM
scenario is similar to the BMES scenario but assumes additionally
that all newly manufactured electric cars are equipped with neo-
dymium magnets. Only the neodymium in the rare earth magnets is
considered and not the dysprosium, which is currently an essential
element in conventional rare earth magnets (Sprecher et al., 2014);
the dysprosium content of rare earth magnets will likely decrease
because neodymium magnets can be manufactured with 80% lower
dysprosium content while retaining or even improving the favorable
characteristics of conventional rare earth magnets (Chen et al.,
2015). In the REM scenario the average electric car contains 690 g
of neodymium, while in the TS and BMES scenarios the average
electric car contains only 10 g of neodymium.
As can be seen from the scenario descriptions, these low-carbon
futures require significant technological change in the electricity and
(road) transportation sectors. We therefore calculated metal require-
ments for these sectors using detailed Life Cycle Inventory (LCI) data,
combined with global annual capital goods production in these sectors,
for instance for PV cells, wind energy, nuclear power plants, and elec-
tric cars (IEA, 2008; Keppler and Cometto, 2012; EPRI, 2004). Annual
electricity production volumes and number of produced vehicles in
each scenario are given in Tables A and C of the supporting informa-
tion. Life Cycle Inventory data showing the amount of metals needed
for the electricity production technologies (Da Silva et al., 2013; Van
der Giesen, 2008; Laleman et al., 2013; Moss et al., 2011; Pihl et al.,
2012; Wilburn, 2011) and amount of metals in the transportation ve-
hicles (Burnham, 2012; Hawkins et al., 2012) are given in Tables B and
D of the supporting information.
For activities other than electricity production and (road) transpor-
tation, we used EXIOBASE, a detailed global multi-regional en-
vironmentally extended Input-Output (IO) model (Tukker et al., 2013;
Wood et al., 2014, 2015; de Koning et al., 2014, 2016). Onto this global
IO model we imposed expected GDP growth from 2000 to 2050 (OECD,
2012b). We further assumed continuation of the trends in general ef-
ficiency improvement as observed from 1999 to 2009 using information
from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The construction of the
WIOD is described in Timmer (2012). Efficiency trends for all regions
considered in our model were obtained by examining the amount of
each input needed to produce a certain output by one of the 35 sectors
available in the constant price series of the WIOD database. We as-
sumed that the observed annual change (observed over a decade) in
inputs required to achieve a certain output will continue until 2050.
The final demand from these other sectors, in combination with the
Leontief inverse of the 2050 table, resulted in an estimate of the pri-
mary demand for metals from these other sectors.
The IO scenario model1 has previously been used to assess the effect
of introducing renewable technologies on GHG emissions (de Koning
et al., 2014, 2016). The scenario model covers the global economy,
divided into four regions: the European Union, other developed coun-
tries, fast-developing countries, and the rest of the world. Each of these
regions is on its own economic development path and connected by
trade with the other regions. Each economic region is divided into 129
products/services and 129 industry sectors. The primary result of the
scenario model is a set of supply-use tables that describe the structural
global economic relationships. Converting the supply-use tables into an
IO model gives us an estimate of the total demand for products in 2050
according to the four different scenarios, and therefore also an estimate
of their total demand per metal in 2050.
The micro-level LCA information is combined with the information
from the global IO model. The amount of metal used by specific climate
change mitigation technologies is added to the rising demand for metals
due to economic growth in general and the build-up of infrastructure in
developing countries. A detailed description of the technologies used in
the different scenarios and their associated metal use is given in the
supporting information.
The scenario model that we have developed is different from pre-
viously published hybrid IO approaches in the field of energy tech-
nology scenarios. One such hybrid approach with a long history is the
combination of MARKAL models with IO (Klaassen et al., 1999). An
example of recent work is Daly et al. (2015), who estimated upstream
CO2 emissions across energy technologies for the UK. MARKAL-IO
models typically focus on a single region and emissions of major air
pollutants, not on the material requirements of energy technologies
against a backdrop of global material requirements, like the scenario
model used in this study. MARKAL models endogenously select the
lowest cost energy technology, while the costs are uncertain and in-
fluence the outcome of the models (Bosetti et al., 2015). In the scenario
model used in this study, energy technology scenarios are exogenously
determined on the basis of technical and socio-economic considera-
tions, and both their GHG emissions and material use are taken into
account, integrated in a global multi-regional IO model.
Another class of hybrid IO models is integrated LCA-IO models.
Typically these models are used to investigate the environmental and
economic impacts of introducing a specific (new) technology in a par-
ticular country. For instance, the influence of using alternative fuel
options for public transportation (Ercan and Tatari, 2015) or the in-
troduction of a sugarcane-based biofuel industry in Australia (Malik
et al., 2014). In these studies the new technology is combined with an
IO model that describes a static economic background. The scenario
model in this study uses LCA data to change a wide range of sectors,
Fig. 1. Conceptual illustration of the viable operating space for metal demand in 2050 based on historical data. Scenarios requiring much higher growth rates of annual supply and
demand than in the past (left) are outside the viable operating space. Scenarios requiring higher cumulative use until 2050 than economic reserves available in 2000 (right) are also
outside the viable operating space. These two figures can be produced for each of the metals analyzed in this study. Please note that scenarios 1, 2, and 3 shown in the graphs are only
examples and do not relate to the actual scenarios in the text.
1 Octave source code implementing the scenarios, all starting data and resulting
supply-use tables are freely downloadable from: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/
research/research-projects/science/cml-cecilia2050-optimal-eu-climate-policy.
A. de Koning et al. Resources, Conservation & Recycling 129 (2018) 202–208
204
from electricity production, transportation, and cement to households.
The IO model does not act as a static background but is changed to
reflect the structure of the economy in 2050 as it develops according to
different scenarios.
Two types of models that do indeed overlap with the scenario model
used in this research are macro-econometric models and computable
equilibrium models (CGE). However, these models do not have the
sectors/product resolution and the GHG and material information re-
quired to enable an assessment as carried out in this study.
A limitation of our combined LCA-IO scenario model is the absence
of built-in economic mechanisms and lack of price information, which
are central elements in macro-econometric and CGE models. Structural
changes in the economy, such as shifts from primary sectors to service
sectors or shifts in trade patterns, have to be added exogenously in the
IO scenario model. A further limitation of our combined LCA-IO sce-
nario model is its lack of a recycling sector that allows for the estima-
tion of metal recycling flows. This means that our scenario model
structurally overestimates annual primary demand for metals in 2050.
3. Results
The 2050 demand per metal and per scenario is calculated with the
combined LCA-IO model, as a ratio to the annual metal demand and
supply in 2000, see Fig. 2. As indicated, in all scenarios we used a global
real GDP growth (in constant prices) based on OECD (2012) of 2.4% per
year, leading to a factor 3.2 higher GDP in 2050 compared with 2000.
The results in Fig. 2 show a general growth in metal demand by a factor
of 3–4, and hence imply a slight overall increase in the metal intensity
of the economy.
The actual metals demand in 2000 and the estimates for metals
demand in 2050 form the basis for an estimate of the cumulative
amount of metals consumed from 2000 until 2050. We use the simplest
assumption on annual rise of consumption of metals from 2000 until
2050: a linear increase in demand for metals. The linear trend as-
sumption gives a higher total use over this period than a compound
growth rate because the compound growth rate is convex to the linear
trend. The resulting estimate for cumulative metal demand is compared
with the known economic reserves in 2000 (Kelly and Matos, 2009).
Cumulative metal demand until 2050 for the four scenarios divided by
the known economic reserves in 2000 is shown in Fig. 3.
The values presented in Figs. 2 and 3 can be recalculated to produce
a compound rate by which the annual production rate or economic
reserve expansion of metals would have to increase. Table 1 does so for
the required growth in metal production, compared with two historical
ranges of production changes; using two different time periods gives
some additional insight into the possibilities for adjusting supply to
demand. Table 2 does so for the required expansion of reserves, com-
pared with the actual expansion of reserves in the past.
4. Discussion
The BAU scenario requires a growth in production of the researched
metals of 2.1–2.4% per year, which in all cases, except for lead, is less
than the historical supply growth between 1980 or 1992 and 2006. This
Fig. 2. Annual supply of metals in 2000 versus demand for metals in 2050 in the BAU,
Techno, BMES and REM scenarios in 2050. Indexed values; annual supply of the metal in
2000 = 1.
Fig. 3. The ratio between cumulative metals demand from 2000 until 2050 and the
known economic reserves in 2000. Economic reserves in 2000 are set at ‘1′. The y-axis has
a logarithmic scale.
Table 1
The annual metal production growth rate required to satisfy demand for metals in 2050.
Category Scenarios of annual growth rate of
production (%)
Observed annual growth rate of
mining production (%)
BAU
2050
TS
2050
BMES
2050
REM
2050
1980–2006 1992–2006
Fe 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.8a 5.0a
Al 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.1 4
Cu 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 4.5 8
Ni 2.4 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.2
Cr 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 3.8
In 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 10 10.8
Nd 2.4 2.4 2.5 4 6.4b 7.5b
Dy 2.4 2.6 3.4 3.4 6.4b 7.5b
Li 2.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 5.7 6.9
Pb 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 0.1 0.8
Zn 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.5
Note: See supporting information for a plot of reported mining production (Figure A).
a Fe ore mining production data.
b Rare earths mining production data.
Table 2
The annual expansion rate required to satisfy cumulative metal demand until 2050.
Category Annual rate of economic reserve expansion
(%)
Observed historical rate of
economic reserve
expansion (%)
BAU
2050
TS
2050
BMES
2050
REM
2050
1992–2006
Fe s. s. s. s. 1.4
Al s. s. s. s. 0.6
Cu 0.6 1 1 1 3
Ni s. s. s. s. 2
Cr 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 −3.8
In 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 n.a.
Nd s. s. s. s. n.a.
Dy s. s. s. s. n.a.
Li 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 4.6
Pb 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 0.4
Zn 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.3
Note: s. means sufficient because the economic reserves in 2000 are already large enough
to satisfy cumulative demand until 2050. No historical data could be found on the de-
velopment of economic reserves of the metals In, Nd, and Dy. See supporting information
for a plot of reported economic reserves (Figure B).
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is partly because future global economic growth is estimated at 2.4%
(OECD, 2012b), considerably lower than over the last 25 years. For
most metals we see a BAU demand growth in line with economic
growth, and very little decoupling of material use from economic
growth. This runs counter to policy intentions of, for instance, large
economic blocks like the EU, whose ambition is to put strong resource-
efficiency policies in place (EC, 2014). For major metals such as Fe, Al,
and Cu, the BAU scenario shows a slight decoupling, due to the fact that
our model is based on the assumption that the efficiency gains shown
by economic sectors in the past can be extrapolated into the future (see
Methods section).
As expected, metal demand is higher in the various low-carbon
scenarios. However, apart from some exceptions, this additional de-
mand is quite small. In the Techno scenario, the introduction of low-
carbon technologies leads to a demand growth in aluminum, copper,
indium, neodymium, dysprosium, and lithium slightly above the base
level of economic growth (2.4% per year, or a factor of 3.2). The largest
demand growth is for lithium, with a factor 4.3 increase in 50 years, or
2.9% per year. Changing the electricity supply mix in the direction of
more renewables, as in the BMES scenario, increases the demand for
metals compared with the BAU scenario, but not by very much. In the
BMES scenario, dysprosium demand becomes larger by a factor of 5.3
than the demand in 2000, while in the BAU scenario this is a factor of
3.2. The REM scenario shows that full electrification of private cars in
2050, using solely neodymium magnet based technology (about 690 g
of Nd per car), raises Nd demand by a factor of 6.9 compared with 2000
(Fig. 2), while in the BAU scenario this is a factor of 3.2. The REM
scenario would require a 4% annual supply growth of Nd.
The annual increase in metals demand is to a large extent de-
termined by the use of these metals in many applications in an ex-
panding global economy, rather than their specific use in renewable
energy technologies, electric cars, and construction (Table E and Table
F in the supporting information). It is only for copper, lithium, and
indium in general, and neodymium in the REM scenario, that demand is
raised substantially above the expansion rate of the global economy by
the change in electricity generation technology and the massive in-
troduction of electric cars. An example is the specific use of lithium in
car batteries. While its use in car batteries increases 2.0 × 103 times,
the overall demand growth for lithium is only a modest factor of 4.3
(2.4% p.a.). This is because lithium is now primarily used in ceramics,
glass, other types of batteries, and greases, rather than for electric car
batteries (DOE, 2010).
Looking at the annual expansion of metal production required for
the BMES scenario, the largest annual increase is found for dysprosium
at 3.4% per year. In the REM scenario, the largest annual increase is
found for neodymium at 4.0% per year.
Fig. 3 shows that the high estimate of cumulative demand for iron,
aluminum, nickel, dysprosium, and neodymium until 2050 can be met
by the currently known economic reserves of metals. However, this
does not mean that no further development of mines is necessary.
Particularly the production rate of dysprosium and neodymium has to
be increased. But as Table 1 shows, historical data on the growth rate of
mining production indicates that this is well within the range of normal
technical capabilities. In the period 1980–2006, the mining production
of the metals under consideration showed a minimum of 2% annual
increase, often exceeding 4% per year. The only exception is mining
production of lead, which saw increases of well below 1%, probably
because the use of lead was restricted in various applications due to
toxicity concerns (Tukker et al., 2006). We refer further to Table 1 and
the supporting information.
For copper, chromium, indium, lithium, zinc, and lead, the current
economic reserves as known in 2000 are not sufficient to meet the
cumulative demand for these metals until 2050. Additional mines of
similar quality have to be developed, metal prices have to increase, or
improvements in mining and refining technology have to be made in
order to expand the economic reserves and satisfy cumulative demand.
These economic reserves would have to increase by a factor of 1.6 for
copper and 23 for indium by 2050, barring substitution.
This annual expansion rate of the economic reserves of copper,
chromium, and lithium is modest: between 1.0% and 3.1%. As shown in
the supporting information, such expansions of economic reserves have
been achieved in the past decades (from 1992 to 2006), in a period of
declining metal prices. Only for indium is a higher expansion of eco-
nomic reserves of close to 7% per year required. Indium is a special
case, however. It is only produced as a by-product of zinc refining. Very
few zinc refineries extract indium in their process at present, whereas
they might do so if the price of indium were to increase, leading to a
much higher supply of indium (USGS, 2012; Polinares, 2012). Elshkaki
and Graedel (2013) also identify indium as problematic. These authors
state that while indium reserves are more than sufficient to meet de-
mand until 2050, the problem lies in increasing the supply rate; how-
ever, they do not make the connection with zinc refining.
The high growth rate of neodymium in the REM scenario may be a
bottleneck. In that scenario, all electric cars are going to use neody-
mium magnets, causing demand for that metal to surge to levels that
require annual expansion rates far above 3%. But alternative technol-
ogies are available for that specific case, such as non-permanent electric
magnets based on copper, as now already used in Tesla cars and some
wind turbines. The answer to this problem is therefore simple: if neo-
dymium supply problems occur, the BMES scenario may become rea-
lity, with private electric cars using non-permanent magnets based on
copper. It should further be noted that a 4% supply expansion of neo-
dymium is still well within the historically realized supply expansion of
6–7% per year up to 2006 (see Table 1).
5. Conclusions
Our work confirms the significant rise in metal requirements for a
low-carbon transition in the (land) transportation and electricity sectors
that has been reported by others (e.g. Kleijn et al., 2011; Gruber et al.,
2011; Alonso et al., 2012; Roelich et al., 2014). Yet we also show that,
because existing uses of metals in other sectors in society will not re-
quire a drastic transition, the overall annual supply increase needed to
satisfy future metal demands in low-carbon scenarios is not extreme.
Indeed, the various scenarios, including those with strong low-carbon
ambitions such as the BMES and REM, require a modest supply growth
compared with recent historical data on the realized growth in metal
supply. This is in line with the conclusions of Elshkaki and Graedel
(2013) and a detailed LCA study of Hertwich et al. (2015) on low-
carbon technologies. They concluded that while copper and iron re-
quirements of the power system would rise significantly, “only two
years of current global copper and one year of iron production will
suffice to build a low-carbon energy system capable of supplying the
world’s electricity needs in 2050”. Because our method does not take
account of recycling as a metal supply source, it might even over-
estimate the demand for primary metals. Iron is such a case. According
Pauliuk et al. (2013), demand for primary steel peaks between 2020
and 2030, and increasing secondary production will satisfy a still in-
creasing total steel demand.
In the context of our framework of a viable operating space, we see
that the BAU and TS scenarios require less supply growth than the
BMES and REM scenarios, but apart from Nd and Dy the differences are
relatively small. We see that for all scenarios the required supply ex-
pansions fall well within the historical supply growth rates. From the
perspective of required growth of economic reserves, the 7% annual
expansion of indium stands out, but this problem is similar in all sce-
narios and can probably be solved by increasing by-production from
Zinc mines. At this point we would therefore conclude that all the
scenarios in principle face similar challenges in metal supply in the
future, rather than some being more viable and others less so, given our
viable operating space framework. These conclusions are obviously
limited to Fe, Al, Cu, Ni, Cr, In, Nd, Dy, Li, Zn, and Pb, the metals we
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researched. The situation could be different for other metals (e.g. silver,
tellurium, and germanium for specific PV technologies, as suggested by
Elshkaki and Graedel (2013)).
There are reasons not to be complacent, however. The analysis
shows that production of virtually all metals relevant for the low-
carbon transition will have to increase significantly. Since it may take a
decade or more to open mines, especially large, deep open-cast mines,
investments in new mining operations have to take place well in ad-
vance of increases in production. At present, however, it is politically
uncertain whether a low-carbon society will develop and, if so, which
scenario will materialize. This makes the return on investment un-
certain and investors may not invest in new mines in time. Demand-
supply imbalances and price hikes may then occur, particularly if
government policies are unexpectedly and widely adopted, causing a
much faster transition to low-carbon technologies and electric vehicles
than the 100% implementation by 2050 that we assumed in our BMES
and REM scenarios. Building new mines and expanding existing ones
has negative local environmental consequences, which can also be a
delay factor, especially if these reserves are located in fragile environ-
ments. Moreover, in the case of several metals it is necessary to exploit
new deposits, which may have lower metal ore concentrations than are
currently available. Extracting metals from ore bodies with lower metal
concentrations means that more energy, water, and auxiliary materials
are needed to extract the metal, with possibly higher environmental
impacts and larger political risks (Prior et al., 2012).
The main message of this research is that availability of Fe, Al, Cu,
Ni, Cr, In, Nd, Dy, Li, Zn, and Pb is unlikely to be a bottleneck for the
transition to a low-carbon energy system. However, the combination of
lack of certainty about return on investment, long lead times in ex-
panding mining production, and concerns about impacts of mining that
delay expansion of mining capacity may well create imbalances in de-
mand and supply (Tukker, 2014; Sprecher et al., 2015).
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